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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 24, 2004, the United States Supreme Court declared in
Blakely v. Washington' that a jury, not a judge, must make all factual
findings2 that form the basis for any punishment imposed on a defen-
dant.3 Blakely clarified the principle announced in Apprendi v. New Jer-
sey4 that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the pre-
scribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt.5
The Blakely case examined Washington State's procedures for im-
posing an "exceptional sentence." Washington allows a judge to impose
an exceptional sentence when a defendant's conduct involves an "aggra-
vating factor" and that conduct provides a substantial and compelling
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1. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2. Except the "fact" of prior convictions. The Revised Code of Washington ("RCW") section
9.94A.525 defines the rules for taking a defendant's prior convictions into account for sentencing.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.525 (2004).
3. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543.
4. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
5. Id. at 490.
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basis to increase the defendant's punishment. 6 The Court ruled that, con-
trary to Washington's practice of allowing a sentencing judge to deter-
mine whether a defendant's conduct satisfies an aggravating factor, 7 a
jury must make all factual findings that increase a defendant's punish-
ment.8 Accordingly, the Court ruled that Washington's existing system
was unconstitutional. 9
The Blakely decision sent Washington legislators, judges, prosecu-
tors, and defense attorneys scrambling to find a solution that would ad-
dress the Court's concerns.10 Although Justice Breyer's dissent identified
four possible solutions for Washington and other states affected by the
Blakely decision,11 the discussion in Washington focused on two possible
solutions: a "judicial advisory" model and a "bifurcated trial" model.' 2
During the 2005 Washington legislative session, the former was embod-
ied in Substitute Senate Bill 5476 ("S.S.B. 5476") and the latter was em-
bodied in Senate Bill 5477 ("S.B. 5477").3 S.S.B. 5476 was referred to
the Senate Ways and Means Committee and was not passed during the
2005 legislative session.' 4 S.B. 5477, on the other hand, was passed by
6. § 9.94A.535. Before the 2005 legislative session, the statute listed approximately twenty-
seven "illustrative" aggravating factors that a court may consider when deciding whether or not to
impose an exceptional sentence. The list includes deliberate cruelty, particular vulnerability, conduct
that was a violent offense and the defendant knew the victim was pregnant, a major economic of-
fense or series of offenses, a major violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, sexual mo-
tivation, an ongoing pattern of sexual abuse against a minor, significant domestic violence, a pre-
sumptive sentence that is too lenient, the offense resulted "in the pregnancy of a child victim rape,"
the defendant took advantage of the victim's lack of a legal custodian, the offense was intended to
"obstruct or impair human or animal health care or agricultural or forestry research or commercial
production," or the offense was first-degree or second-degree trafficking and the victim was a minor
at the time. Id. Because the list was illustrative before the 2005 legislative session, rather than ex-
haustive, additional aggravating factors were established through common law. Interview with Scott
O'Toole, King County Senior Deputy Prosecutor, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 18, 2004) [hereinafter
O'Toole Interview].
7. § 9.94A.535.
8. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2538.
9. Id. at 2543.
10. Maureen O'Hagan, Lawyers try to sort out effects of court ruling on sentencing; Washing-
ton 's system in jeopardy; Effect on current inmates remains uncertain; some fear state might return
to old practices, SEATTLE TIMES, June 26, 2004, at B1; Tracy Johnson, Serious Crimes, Less-Severe
Sentences; Judges Try to Discern How Badly the System Has Been Upended, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, July 12, 2004, at Al.
11. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
12. Interviews with Professor David Boemer, Seattle University School of Law, and Mr. Aldo
Melchiori, Senior Counsel for the Washington State Senate Judiciary Committee, in Seattle, Wash.
(Oct. 1, 2004) (on file with the authors) [hereinafter Boemer Interview and Melchiori Interview].
13. S.S.B. 5476, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); S.B. 5477, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2005).
14. Summary Page for Substitute Senate Bill 5476, available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/
wsladm/billinfol/dspBillSummary.cfm?billnumber'5476&year=2005 (last visited Apr. 26, 2005)
(on file with the authors).
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the legislature on April 14, 2005, and was signed into law by Governor
Christine Gregoire on April 15, 2005.15
This Note reviews the Blakely decision and the Washington Legis-
lature's response in S.B. 5477. Part 1I discusses the problem that Blakely
created for Washington's sentencing guidelines system. Part III analyzes
the judicial advisory and bifurcated trial proposals and explains why
Washington wisely adopted the bifurcated trial approach. Part IV identi-
fies key issues that are raised by using a bifurcated trial and analyzes
how S.B. 5477 addresses, or fails to address, those issues. Finally, Part V
concludes by suggesting that the legislature should have provided for the
following in its bill responding to the Blakely decision: a provision al-
lowing bifurcation for all trials with an aggravating factor; a provision
allowing the prosecution to amend the initial charge with additional fac-
tors if the majority of evidence that supports a new aggravating factor
emerges at trial; a provision allowing judges to order bifurcation when
the evidence would not have been admissible pre-Blakely and when jus-
tice so requires; and, a provision that requires courts to apply the Wash-
ington Rules of Evidence to both phases of a bifurcated trial.
II. THE CURRENT FACE OF ENHANCED CRIMINAL
SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON
A. Sentencing Enhancements Beyond the Statutory Maximum:
Apprendi v. New Jersey
Much of the Supreme Court's analysis in Blakely rested on the
Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey,16 in which the Court first ad-
dressed the constitutional role of the jury in determining facts that en-
hance a defendant's punishment. The defendant in Apprendi pled guilty
to second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, an
offense punishable by five to ten years in prison. 17 Following the guilty
plea, the prosecution filed a motion to enhance the charge based on New
Jersey's hate-crime statute.18 That statute allowed a trial judge to impose
an extended sentence if the judge found by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that "the defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose
to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color,
15. Summary Page for Senate Bill 5477, available at http://www.leg.wa.gov/wsladm/
billinfol/dspBillSummary.cfm?billnumber-5477&year=2005 (last visited Apr. 26, 2005) (on file
with the authors).
16. 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
17. Id. at 468-70.
18. Id. at 470-71.
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gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity."' 9 The
amended filing was based on a retracted statement made by the defen-
dant20 that was not used to prove an element of the crime and was not
admitted to by the defendant.21
The judge found that the defendant had acted with a purpose to in-
timidate and applied the hate crime enhancement, sentencing him to
twelve years in prison.22 The defendant appealed, arguing that the "Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the finding
of bias upon which his hate crime sentence was based must be proved to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt," and not left to the trial judge to make
a determination based upon a preponderance of the evidence. 23 The Ap-
pellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey affirmed, holding
that the legislature had made the hate crime enhancement a sentencing
factor rather than an element of the crime.2 4 The New Jersey Supreme
Court also affirmed the trial court's decision, deferring to the state legis-
lature and holding that the enhancement served as a legitimate balance
between the efforts of hate-crime statutes to avoid punishing mere
thought and the "State's compelling interest in vindicating the right to be
free of invidious discrimination., 25 As a result, the New Jersey Supreme
Court did not address the defendant's claim that the trial court created a
new element of the crime with a different standard of proof.
A year before Apprendi, in Jones v. United States,26 the United
States Supreme Court had framed a question similar to the issue raised
by Apprendi: "[W]hen a jury determination has not been waived, may
judicial fact-finding by a preponderance support the application of a pro-
vision that increases the potential severity of the penalty for a variant of a
given crime?" 27 Although the Court felt that Jones was not the proper
28case in which to answer that question, the facts in Apprendi provided
the Court with the opportunity to do so.
The Court answered with the following constitutional rule: Other
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for
a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum, whether the statute
calls it an element or a sentencing factor, must be submitted to a jury and
19. Id. at 468-69 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West 1999-2000)).
20. Id. at 471.
21. Id. at 470-73.
22. Id. at 471.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 472-73.
26. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
27. Id. at 242.
28. See id. at 251-52.
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proved beyond a reasonable doubt.29 Moreover, the Court held that "[i]t
is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assess-
ment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a
criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be
established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt., 30
Under the Apprendi rule, if a statute
links specific facts to specific maximum sentences, the facts neces-
sary for each such maximum sentence are elements of the offense.
In this way, the court determines the "prescribed statutory maxi-
mum" sentence and whether the sentence has been unconstitution-
ally "increased" above that level by a finding of fact not made as an
element of the offense. 31
Accordingly, the conviction of a defendant is based upon the jury's ap-
plication of fact to the pertinent law and its determination that each ele-
ment has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.32
The Apprendi rule equates a finding of fact with an element of the
crime if that fact "extend[s] the defendant's sentence beyond the maxi-
mum authorized by the jury's verdict., 33 But it does not do so if that fact
fails to increase the defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maxi-
mum. 34 In other words, "[s]entencing factors that regulate the sentence
imposed, but do not produce a sentence exceeding the maximum author-
ized by the offense elements established by the jury's verdict, are consis-
tent with the Apprendi rule." 35
A question that arose from the Apprendi decision, and the question
that was answered in Blakely, is whether a jury must make the factual
findings that support an aggravating factor that increases a defendant's
sentence within the prescribed statutory guidelines.
29. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
30. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1992)).
31. Benjamin J. Priester, Structuring Sentencing: Apprendi, the Offense of Conviction, and the
Limited Role of Constitutional Law, 79 IND. L.J. 863, 875 (2004).
32. See id. at 874-75.
33. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 550, 557 (2002) ("Apprendi said that any fact ex-
tending the defendant's sentence beyond the maximum authorized by the jury's verdict would have
been considered an element of an aggravated crime.., by those who framed the Bill of Rights.").
34. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483, n.10 (noting that the trial judge's "role in sentencing is con-
strained at its outer limits by the facts alleged in the indictment and found by the jury") (emphasis
added).
35. Priester, supra note 31, at 876.
2005] 1125
Seattle University Law Review
B. Sentencing Enhancements Within the Statutory Guidelines:
Blakely v. Washington
The Supreme Court revisited Apprendi and a jury's constitutional
role in determining facts that increase a defendant's punishment when it
delivered its recent decision in Blakely v. Washington.3 6 In Blakely, the
defendant pled guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife.37 The defendant
admitted to the elements of second-degree kidnapping involving domes-
tic violence and the use of a firearm, but he did not admit to any other
relevant facts.38 Those admitted facts, when considered alone, would
have justified a sentence of no more than fifty-three months under the
Washington State Sentencing Guidelines. 39 Instead, the trial judge sen-
tenced the defendant to an exceptional sentence of ninety months in
prison based on the judge's finding that the defendant had acted with
"deliberate cruelty,, 40 a statutorily permissible ground for imposing an
exceptional sentence above the sentencing guidelines but within the
statutory maximum.
4'
The trial judge apparently 42 followed the direction of State v.
Gore,43 which held that any "reason offered to justify an exceptional sen-
tence can be considered only if it takes into account factors other than
those which are used in computing the standard range sentence for the
offense.",44 However, the facts used to justify the sentencing enhance-
ment for the defendant were neither asserted by the prosecution to con-
vict the defendant of kidnapping in the second degree, nor were they ad-
mitted to by the defendant.4S Although statutorily permitted, the increase
in the defendant's sentence was based on facts and evidence neither ad-
mitted to by him, nor determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.46
For these reasons, and faced with an unforeseen increase of more
than three years in his sentence, the defendant appealed the trial court's
application of the sentencing enhancement. He argued that the facts con-
sidered for the enhancement were outside the scope of his guilty plea
36. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
37. Id. at 2534.
38. Id. at 2534-35.
39. Id. at 2534.
40. Id. at 2535.
41. Id. See generally WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(2)(h)(iii) (2004) (identifying "deliberate
cruelty" as an aggravating factor that may be considered for the imposition of an exceptional sen-
tence if the trial judge finds that there are "substantial and compelling reasons justifying an excep-
tional sentence").
42. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537-38.
43. 143 Wash. 2d 288, 21 P.3d 262 (2001).
44. Id. at 315-16, 21 P.3d at 277-78.
45. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
46. Id. at 2537-38.
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because they were not legally essential for a determination of guilt on the
underlying crime. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision and the Washington Supreme Court denied discretionary
review.47 The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.48
In a five-to-four decision written by Justice Scalia, the United
States Supreme Court reversed the trial court. 49 In doing so, the Court
reaffirmed the holding in Apprendi, stating that "every defendant has the
right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all the facts legally es-
sential to the punishment., 50 Justice Scalia rejected the State's argument
that "there was no Apprendi violation because the relevant 'statutory
maximum' is not 53 months, but the 10-year maximum for class B felo-
nies," and he made clear that "the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the ba-
sis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defen-
dant.' '51 Therefore, "[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's
verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which
the law makes essential to the punishment ... and the judge exceeds his
proper authority. 52
Justice Thomas's concurrence in Apprendi53 predicted the results of
Blakely. In that concurrence, he focused upon the distinctions, or lack
thereof, between an element of the crime and a sentencing factor.54 Plac-
ing weight upon an 1872 criminal law treatise to illustrate the long his-
tory of courts separating elements from sentencing factors, Justice Tho-
mas reasoned that the traditional interpretation of the indictment was to
inform the defendant of the elements of the crime charged against him,
that "the indictment must allege whatever is in law essential to the pun-
ishment sought to be inflicted. 55 According to the Blakely decision, the
factual findings that match those legal "essentials" must be found by a
jury.5
6
47. Id. at 2536.
48. State v. Blakely, III Wash. App. 851, 47 P.3d 149 (2002), review denied, State v. Blakely,
148 Wash. 2d 1010, 62 P.3d 889 (2003), cert. granted, Blakely v. Washington, 540 U.S. 965 (2003).
49. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2543.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2537.
52. Id.
53. 530 U.S. 466, 499 (2000).
54. Id. at 499-501.
55. Id. at 510 (quoting J. BISHOP, LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 50 (2d ed. 1872) ("The in-
dictment must allege whatever is in law essential to the punishment sought to be inflicted.") and J.
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON CRIMINAL LAW 564-65 (5th ed. 1872) ("If it is sought to make the
sentence heavier by reason of its being [a second or third offence], the fact thus relied on must be
averred in the indictment; because the rules of criminal procedure require the indictment, in all
cases, to contain an averment of every fact essential to the punishment sought to be inflicted.")).
56. 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
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At least one well-known judge has commented on the Blakely deci-
sion. In a July 6, 2004 opinion, Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals suggested that the scope of the Blakely decision placed
a grip upon the "authority of the sentencing judge to find the facts that
determine how that discretion shall be implemented and to do so on the
basis of only the civil burden of proof. The vices of the guidelines are
thus that they require the sentencing judge to make findings of fact...
,57 This was similar to Justice Scalia's contention in Blakely,58 as well as
to Justice Thomas's concurrence in Apprendi,59 that when facts support-
ing a defendant's exceptional sentence are neither admitted to by the de-
fendant nor tried by a jury, the imposed exceptional sentence will violate
that defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. In other words,
in a sentencing hearing or in a trial setting, the facts that the government
must prove to impose a sentence must be alleged in the indictment and
proven to the factfinder or admitted to by the defendant; it is not for the
trial court to determine the facts to be considered or to decide if those
facts exist.
Addressing the implications that the majority's opinion would have
for the sentencing procedures of numerous states and the federal gov-
ernment, Justice Breyer's Blakely dissent enumerates four possible op-
tions that state legislatures can adopt.60 First, legislatures are welcome to
create a "simple, pure or nearly pure 'charge offense' or 'determinate'
sentencing system. 61 Second, Justice Breyer suggests that legislatures
can implement an indeterminate sentencing scheme that existed in most
states prior to recent sentencing reform acts.62 Third, the structured sen-
tencing schemes now in place could remain with the addition of new
crimes that match the enhancements previously imposed by trial
judges. 63 Finally, Justice Breyer postulates that Congress and state legis-
latures could rewrite the criminal codes, fastening lengthy and extreme
sentences to each crime followed by exhaustive lists of mitigating fac-
tors.64
57. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2004).
58. 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
59. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 499 (2000).
60. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2552-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2552.
62. Id. at 2553.
63. Id. at 2554.
64. Id. at 2558.
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III. POST-BLAKELY OPTIONS CONSIDERED BY
THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE
As a result of the Blakely decision, the Washington Legislature
faced the unenviable task of creating new legislation that respects the
Blakely decision, but protects the policy considerations that underlie the
current sentencing guidelines system. Interviews with two individuals
involved with that process, Professor David Boerner and Mr. Aldo Mel-
chiori,6 5 shed light on the two proposals that received the most attention.
Before discussing those two proposals, it is important to acknowl-
edge the option that the Washington Legislature did not consider. The
legislature did not consider a system of "statutory maximums" where the
severity of the sentencing guidelines would be increased to the statutory
maximum, offset by a significant increase in the list of mitigating fac-
tors.66 For example, the legislature could have revised the standard range
for second-degree kidnapping with a firearm, both charges to which the
defendant in Blakely pled guilty, 67 from forty-nine to fifty-three months
to 120 months (the current statutory maximum for class B felonies in
Washington).6 8 Such a system would conform with Blakely because a
jury would make factual findings on all the elements of the underlying
crimes and then a judge could impose a sentence lower than the statutory
maximum based on mitigating circumstances. Because a finding of miti-
gating circumstances results in a reduction of the defendant's sentence,
those circumstances need not be found by a jury.
A "statutory maximum" system was not seriously considered by the
legislature because it would have provided judges with a tremendous
amount of sentencing discretion without any framework to review that
sentencing for abuse of discretion.70 Given the severity of possible pun-
ishment under such a system, the lack of meaningful review 7' is fatal.
65. See Boerner Interview and Melchiori Interview, supra note 12. Professor Boerner is the
current Chair of the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission.
66. Such a system would be in line with the fourth option articulated by Justice Breyer in his
Blakely dissent. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2558 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 2534-35.
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.20.02(l)(b) (2004).
69. Only facts that increase, not decrease, a defendant's sentence must be submitted to a jury.
Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
70. RCW 9.94A.585(1) provides that "[a] sentence within the standard range, under RCW
9.94A.510 or 9.94A.517, for an offense shall not be appealed." § 9.94A.585(1). Even if defendants
were allowed to appeal sentences within the standard range, which seems unlikely due to fiscal
concerns, a defendant would need to show that there was no basis for the exercise of discretion and
that "no reasonable man would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Hurst, 5 Wash.
App. 146, 148, 486 P.2d 1136, 1137-38 (1971).
71. See DAVID BOERNER, SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE
SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 1981 9-2 (1985).
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Additionally, the cost of requiring a hearing of mitigating circumstances
in every case would likely be cost-prohibitive7 2 and would likely conflict
with the stated purpose of ensuring that the defendant's punishment is
proportionate to both the seriousness of the offense and the defendant's
criminal history.73
We now turn to a discussion of the two proposals that the Washing-
ton Legislature considered for adoption: a judicial advisory model and a
bifurcated trial model. As discussed above, 74 the judicial advisory pro-
posal was embodied in S.S.B. 5476, which did not pass the legislature,
and the bifurcated trial proposal was embodied in S.B. 5477, which did
pass the legislature and was signed into law by Governor Gregoire.
A. The Judicial Advisory Model
The Washington judiciary was the leading proponent of the judicial
advisory model that was embodied in S.S.B. 5476. 75 Under that model,
the upper limit of the standard sentencing range in the current guidelines
would have become merely advisory for violent offenses.76 A judge
could then choose to follow the guidelines or abandon them in favor of a
more lenient or a more severe sentence.77 Although the guidelines would
have continued to exist for violent offenses, the discretion afforded by a
judicial advisory model is more similar to the indeterminate system that
existed before the current guidelines were established. Such a model
would be similar to the second option described by Justice Breyer in his
The purpose, and the promise, of substantive appellate review of [exceptional] sentences
is threefold. First, because a record to review is required, it will insure that the reasons for
which sentences are imposed are articulated; thus it informs the defendant why he or she
received that particular sentence. Second, it provides a means to correct the truly aberra-
tional sentence. Third, and in the long run most importantly, it provides the opportunity
for the development of a body of principled decisions to guide sentencing judges in con-
struing and applying the Sentencing Reform Act; a common law of sentencing to fill the
interstices in the legislative declaration of sentencing policy.
Id.
72. A purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act is to "[m]ake frugal use of the state's resources."
§ 9.94A.010(6).
73. § 9.94A.010(1); see also BOERNER, supra note 71, at 2-31, 32 (discussing how the goal of
proportionality gives rise to the need for classifications of crimes with different maximum sen-
tences).
74. See supra Part 1.
75. S.S.B. 5476, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (on file with the authors).
76. S.S.B. 5476 § 2(1).
77. But see Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539 (2004). Justice Scalia argued that
Apprendi supports and effectuates the purpose of keeping the control of judgments in the hands of
the jury by "ensuring that the judge's authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict.
Without that restriction, the jury would not exercise the control that the Framers [of the Constitution]
intended." Id.
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Blakely dissent 78 and would comport with Blakely because a defendant's
sentence stays within the standard range suggested by the guidelines.79
The benefit of S.S.B. 5476's judicial advisory model is that judges
could have imposed personalized sentences on defendants. While the
sentencing guidelines were developed to eliminate disparity among
judges and across racial or socioeconomic lines, their rigidity means that
some defendants receive punishments that do not reflect the severity of
their crimes. For example, according to Judge Sperline, the trial judge
who accepted Blakely's guilty plea, Blakely deserved more punishment
than the forty-nine to fifty-three months provided by the sentencing
guidelines for his guilty plea.80 Judge Sperline testified that given the
egregious nature of the facts, a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three
months did not fit the retributive effects of the penal system.8' Moreover,
such restrictions on sentencing significantly dampen the power given to
elected judges by the community that expects them to uphold justice.82
Ultimately, Judge Sperline stated his belief that justice requires that
someone independent of the rough and tumble plea bargaining process
have the authority and power to insist that compelling facts, such as the
ones in Blakely, are responded to with an exceptional sentence. 83
Furthermore, unlike juries who are selected for one particular case,
a trial judge has a reservoir of experience by which to fashion an appro-
priate sentence. For example, most jurors would find that any rape con-
stitutes "deliberate cruelty," an aggravating factor under the Sentencing
Reform Act ("SRA"). Accordingly, a jury may be more prone to find that
a rape defendant acted with deliberate cruelty, and under a bifurcated
trial system, such a situation is inevitable. But under the judicial advisory
model, a judge could have determined an appropriate sentence based on
the judge's experience and the defendant's conduct.
More personalized sentencing may seem tempting in the most vio-
lent of cases, but a return to an indeterminate system poses a number of
significant problems. First and foremost, by turning back the clock to a
pre-guidelines system, the legislature would have returned Washington
78. Id. at 2553 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 750 (2005) (noting that advisory guidelines
comport with Blakely because "when a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sen-
tence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the
judge deems relevant").
80. Testimony of Grant City Judge Evan Sperline before the House Criminal Justice and Cor-
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to a system that was rejected 84 by the legislature because of disparity 85 in
sentencing along racial lines86 and disparity in sentencing among differ-
ent judges.87 The legislature adopted the guidelines in the early 1980s in
order to address substantial bias and inconsistency in the pre-guidelines
system. 88 Although it can be argued that society continues to improve its
awareness of racial bias,89 including subconscious bias, it is far from
clear that removal of the guidelines would not result in a return to a dis-
parity in sentencing. For example, Professor Boerner points out that sig-
nificant racial disparity still exists when a court is free to use alternatives
to the presumptive sentence range, such as a first-time offender waiver.90
"In 1998, 37 percent of eligible white offenders received first-time of-
fender sentences, while only 25 percent of eligible black offenders and
22.5 percent of eligible members of other minority groups received such
sentences." 91 Data from 2000 reflects roughly the same concerns, par-
ticularly the dramatic difference between Caucasians (32 percent) and
Hispanics (19 percent).92 Such statistics demonstrate that while increased
discretion might provide judges with an opportunity to ensure that justice
is given to both victims and defendants, such a noble cause would fail
miserably if that discretion were abused due to intentional or subcon-
scious bias.93 Furthermore, when discretion is limited, the sentencing
84. Professor Boemer has noted that the SRA, which gave rise to the current system, was a
reflection that "[m]any of the assumptions upon which the indeterminate system was based have
been rejected or substantially limited." BOERNER, supra note 71, at 1-1.
85. One of the stated purposes for the SRA is to ensure that sentences "[are] commensurate
with the punishment imposed on others committing similar offenses." WASH. REV. CODE §
9.94A.010(3) (2004).
86. Boemer & Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 CRIME & JUSTICE 71, 72,
126 (2001).
87. Id. at 72, 123. See also Dan Kilpatrick & Jack Brummel, Sentencing Study, 52 WASH. L.
REV. 103, 119 (1976) ("The extensive disparity documented by this study indicates that the present
sentencing system in King County is inequitable, because the sentence received in many instances
depends on which judge is doing the sentencing .... ).
88. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 86, at 126-27 (noting that, under the guidelines, disparity in
sentencing by race is "accounted for by differences in legally relevant variables-the offense of
conviction and prior criminal record" and that "there are no significant differences in sentences
imposed under the guidelines for those convicted of the same crime with the same offender score").
89. See id. at 126-27.
90. Id. at 127.
91. Id. at 128.
92. In 2000, the rates for first-time offender waivers were as follows: Caucasians, 32 percent;
AsianJPacific Islander, 29 percent; Native American, 27 percent; African American, 25 percent; and
Hispanic, 19 percent. STATE OF WASHINGTON SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION,
REPRESENTATION AND EQUITY IN WASHINGTON STATE: AN ASSESSMENT OF DISPROPORTIONALITY
AND DISPARITY IN ADULT FELONY SENTENCING, FISCAL YEAR 2000 64 [hereinafter ASSESSMENT
OF DISPARITY].
93. See Boerner & Lieb, supra note 86, at 128 (noting that "[t]he lesson is powerful: racial
disparity is correlated with unstructured and unreviewed discretion").
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guidelines appear to address these historical concerns; 94 however, the
current disparity in exceptional sentences for Native Americans illus-
trates that the problem has not disappeared. 95
Even if the legislature were convinced 96 that concerns for uniform-
ity across racial and socioeconomic lines were no longer paramount, and
that individual judges would impose sentences consistent with one an-
other, 97 a judicial advisory model would have granted trial judges a sub-
stantial amount of discretion that is essentially free from judicial re-
view.98 Although the legislature must respect the ability of judges to
wisely exercise their discretion, such unchecked power is troubling in
light of the apparently infrequent number of successful appeals in the
years prior to the implementation of the Washington sentencing guide-
lines. 99 The lack of reversals during a period when judges had the discre-
tion sought by the judicial advisory model suggests that the legislature
should be particularly wary of such discretion if racial and socioeco-
nomic bias remain valid concerns-without the structure provided by the
94. "[F]or all standard range sentences for ranked offenses, the SRA is functioning in accord
with its intent/purpose regarding proportionate treatment of offenders." ASSESSMENT OF DISPARITY,
supra note 92 at 78. "While the sentencing grid is apparently successful in eliminating disparate
treatment in standard range sentencing ... disparate treatment is present in sentencing alternatives,
exceptional sentences, and especially 'Three-Strike life sentences."' Id. at 87.
95. In 2000, the rate of exceptional sentences per thousand felony sentences among each racial
group was as follows: Asian/Pacific Islander, 2.6 percent; African American, 4.4 percent; Caucasian,
4.7 percent; Hispanic, 5.1 percent; and Native Americans, 7.4 percent. Id. at 71.
96. The legislature appears unconvinced. RCW 9.94A.850(2)(h)(i) requires that the Sentencing
Guidelines Commission produce a bi-annual report to the Governor and the legislature on "[r]acial
disproportionality in juvenile and adult sentencing, and, if available, the impact that diversions, such
as youth courts, have on racial disproportionality in juvenile prosecution, adjudication, and sentenc-
ing." WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.850(2)(h)(i) (2004).
97. At least one commentator has noted that disparity was the natural result of judicial discre-
tion in sentencing:
The underlying thesis of this grant of discretion [before the implementation of the sen-
tencing guidelines] is that it allowed judges to consider all the circumstances of each in-
dividual case and craft a sentence appropriate to those circumstances. But inevitably this
individualization encompassed both the circumstances of the individual case and the in-
dividuality of the sentencing judge .... Judges differ in their views as to the purposes of
sentencing, both generally and in the individual case, and they differ in the degree of
relevance they assign particular factors bearing on those purposes. The result, inevitably,
was disparity.
BOERNER, supra note 71, at 2-27.
98. S.S.B. 5476, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005) (on file with the authors).
99. Professor Boerner, a member of the original Sentencing Guidelines Commission and its
current Chair, believes there had been only one successful appeal under the abuse of discretion stan-
dard in the eighty years leading up to implementation of the guidelines in Washington. See Boerner
Interview, supra note 12. Professor Boemer suggests that the reason for so few successful appeals
was the lack of applicable standards and the lack of a reporting mechanism for a judge's rationale by
which an appellate court could make the abuse of discretion determination. BOERNER, supra note 71,
at 3-16.
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existing guidelines, appellate review would likely return to a rubber-
stamp of a trial judge's discretion. Regardless of the deference that
judges might °° give to "advisory guidelines," there is no way to place a
meaningful check on a judge's discretion under such a system.
Finally, the unpredictable nature of returning to a purely discretion-
ary system is problematic for two additional reasons. First, the prosecu-
tion and the defense would lose the amount of certainty that the guide-
lines currently provide. A prosecutor's ability to reach an equitable plea
bargain is potentially diminished by the "unknown" factors that might
influence a judge's decision, and an unsophisticated defendant could
agree to an unjust plea bargain' 0 without understanding the most likely
sentence for his criminal behavior. These concerns are important given
the substantial role that plea bargains play in the Washington criminal
justice system.'02
Second, returning to a discretionary system would create uncer-
tainty with regard to our prison population'0 3 and its fiscal impact. 0 4 Al-
though fiscal concerns may seem secondary given that a defendant has
engaged in criminal behavior, those fiscal concerns were a significant
force behind the implementation of the sentencing guidelines. 10 5 Given
100. According to Mr. Melchiori, judges were surveyed at a recent Superior Court Judges
Association meeting. See Melchiori Interview, supra note 12. The judges indicated that they would
follow the guidelines in roughly ninety-five percent of cases. Id. However, there was significant
disagreement by the judges as to whether the survey was properly done. Id. Although the survey was
informal, it is at least anecdotal evidence that the judges who were present at the meeting believed
that the guidelines are appropriate in the vast majority of cases. Id.
101. A valid plea of guilty is one "entered [by a defendant] fully aware of the direct conse-
quences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his
own counsel .... Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (citing Shelton v. United States,
246 F.2d 571, 572, n.2 (5th Cir. 1957)).
102. In 2003, 1.8 percent of criminal cases resulted in a bench trial, 3.3 percent resulted in a
jury trial, and 94.9 percent resulted in a guilty plea. STATE OF WASHINGTON SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMISSION, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING FISCAL YEAR
2003 20 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.sgc.wa.gov/PUBS/Statistical%20Summaries/
FY2003_StatisticalSummary.pdf [hereinafter STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY
SENTENCING].
103. For example, in 1974, 17.5 percent of convicted felons in King County were committed to
prison; 32 percent of convicted felons in Pierce County were committed to prison; and 14 percent of
convicted felons in Snohomish County were committed to prison. Christopher Bayley, Good Inten-
tions Gone Awry-A Proposal for Fundamental Change in Criminal Sentencing, 51 WASH. L. REV.
529, 536, n.22 (1976); see also BOERNER, supra note 71, at 2-37 ("The Sentencing Reform Act was
a vehicle by which the Legislature reasserted its authority to set sentencing policy, and thus to make
the fundamental policy decision as to what level of incarceration is in the public interest.").
104. A purpose of the SRA is to "[m]ake frugal use of the state's resources." WASH. REV.
CODE § 9.94A.010(6) (2004).
105. BOERNER, supra note 71, at 2-37 (noting "the rising cost of incarceration was a major
factor in the legislative consensus that resulted in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act").
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the current economic downturn, '0 6 the legislature would have been hard-
pressed to pass a system that might have increased the resources required
by the criminal justice system. Without guidelines that can estimate the
sentencing that is likely to occur each year, the legislature would essen-
tially be gambling that the renewed discretion would not result in a sig-
nificant increase in the prison population. 0 7 Such a gamble would con-
flict with the statutory directive that the Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
sion include alternatives to proposed guideline revisions or modifications
that would exceed the capacity of correctional facilities, '0 8 and would
also be troubling considering the success that the guidelines have had in
reducing the inmate population.' 09
Judicial discretion is important because the citizens of Washington
expect that their elected judges will use that discretion to impose appro-
priate punishments. But judicial discretion, especially in cases where the
punishment will be most severe, fails its purpose of seeking justice if
wielded in a disparate manner. The ability to punish a handful of defen-
dants more severely does not outweigh the risk that similarly situated
defendants may be punished quite differently based on their geographic
location, their socioeconomic status, or the color of their skin.
B. The Bifurcated Trial Model
The second proposed solution to Blakely, and the one that was
passed by the Washington Legislature and signed into law by Governor
Gregoire," 0 is the bifurcated trial model. Under that model, a judge may
divide a trial into two phases based on the evidence that will be presented
to prove the existence of an aggravating factor. During the first phase of
the trial, each side presents its case and the jury renders a verdict on the
underlying crimes for which the defendant was charged. During the sec-
ond phase of the trial, the prosecution presents its evidence of aggravat-
ing circumstances and the defense may rebut that evidence. The jury then
makes factual findings that support, or refute, those aggravating circum-
stances.
106. Brad Shannon, State Revenue Forecast Static, THE OLYMPIAN, Nov. 17, 2004, at South
Sound B (indicating that Washington faces "a nearly $1.7 billion budget shortfall for the 2005-07
budget cycle").
107. Boemer & Lieb, supra note 86, at 71 (noting that "[g]uidelines allow a state to set sen-
tences with advance knowledge of the consequences to prison and jail populations").
108. See § 9.94A.850(b).
109. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 86, at 94-95 ("The consequences for the prison population
was dramatic ... this [post-guidelines] shift reduced the state's overall imprisonment rate from 20
percent in 1982 to 17 percent in 1988 and significantly reduced prison commitments.").
1 10. See supra Part I.
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Because Blakely requires that the jury be exposed to evidence of
aggravating circumstances that might otherwise be deemed too prejudi-
cial for the jury to consider during the prosecution's case in chief, the
bifurcated model requires that the judge hold a pre-trial "prejudice hear-
ing" and make a determination as to whether bifurcation is needed to
protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.'11 If bifurcation is unneces-
sary, there is no second phase and each side presents all of its evidence,
including evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, during
the first and only phase of the trial. The jury then determines whether the
defendant is guilty of the charged crimes and any aggravating factors.
If bifurcation is ordered, the jury can first focus on evidence that
supports the elements of the underlying crimes and can then review, in a
separate trial, evidence that supports the alleged aggravating factors.
When a factor that might aggravate the charges would be unfairly preju-
dicial to the defendant, bifurcation eliminates the source of potential
prejudice and allows the jury to concentrate upon the actual elements of
the crime.
Unlike the judicial advisory model, the bifurcated trial model pro-
vides a procedural post-Blakely fix that allows much of Washington's
current system to remain intact, including the sentencing guidelines. Al-
though a bifurcated model necessarily restricts a judge's ability to engage
in nearly any sort of factfinding, such restrictions are the inevitable result
of the Blakely decision. The jury must make all factual findings that are
used to increase a defendant's sentence, and the bifurcated model ac-
complishes just that.
Providing the option of a bifurcated model poses a minimal fiscal
burden to Washington because relatively few cases require bifurcation.
In 2003, approximately 100 out of 27,213 criminal cases in Washington
involved a contested exceptional sentence. 1 2 Furthermore, as discussed
in more detail below, the legislature limited the availability of bifurcated
trials to only four of the forty-plus aggravating factors listed in S.B.
5477. Although bifurcated trials for this small portion of cases will un-
11l. The determination of "prejudice" is not analogous to a prejudicial determination under
Washington Rule of Evidence 403 because highly prejudicial evidence will be at its probative peak
when it is used to prove the existence of an aggravating factor. Therefore, the need to bifurcate arises
from the goal of ensuring a trial that comports with the spirit of due process and the right to a fair
trial. For example, Kansas, which has adopted a bifurcated trial approach, allows a judge to order
bifurcation if it is "in the interest of justice." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(4) (2003). See also
infra Part IV.D.
112. An exact number of contested exceptional sentences is not available; however, Professor
Boemer indicated that this was an approximate number that was used during the deliberations that
led to S.S.B. 5476 and S.B. 5477. Boerner Interview, supra note 12. We do know that out of 27,213
felony sentences in 2003, exceptional sentences based on aggravating factors were imposed only 751
times. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 102, at iv, 21.
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doubtedly have a fiscal impact, such costs are necessary for Washington
to comport with the Blakely decision while protecting a defendant's con-
stitutional right to a fair trial.
The success of the bifurcated model in Kansas suggests that it
should work well in Washington.1 13 After the Kansas sentencing guide-
lines scheme was declared unconstitutional by the Kansas Supreme
Court, 114 the Kansas Legislature responded with a bifurcated trial
model.1 15 Under the Kansas model, a jury that returns a guilty verdict is
provided with instructions on the aggravating circumstances and is sent
back for further deliberation.' 16
A bifurcated approach has also worked well in at least one post-
Blakely case in Washington. In a recent conversation with King County
Prosecutor Scott O'Toole, we discussed the impact of Blakely on how he
charged and tried the case of State v. Dunn.'1 7 That case was the first
post-Blakely case in Washington to use a bifurcated model when an ag-
gravating factor was alleged. 18
In 2001, the defendant in Dunn allegedly kidnapped a six-year-old
boy and subjected the child to extreme sexual abuse. 119 The child was
recovered alive twenty-four hours after having been abducted.1 20 Because
of the recovery of the child, as well as a concern for public values and
sentiment, the King County Prosecutor's Office felt it was appropriate to
charge the defendant with aggravating factors. 121
Following the Blakely opinion, Mr. O'Toole decided to pursue
three aggravating factors: 1) the offense was done with sexual motiva-
tion; 2) the offense was one of deliberate cruelty; and 3) the offense was
committed against a vulnerable victim. 122 Mr. O'Toole originally in-
tended to pursue two additional aggravating factors, the random nature of
the act and the effect the crime had upon the community, but he chose to
eliminate those factors because of the uncertainty that surrounded the
Blakely decision.123 One reason for Mr. O'Toole's decision was to limit
113. Brief of Kansas Appellate Defender Office as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
*7-8, Blakely v. Washington, 125 S. Ct. 21 (2003) (No. 02-1632) (praising the Kansas Legislature
for adopting a bifurcated model and noting that it allowed "the legislative intent to promote uniform-
ity and standardize sentences, while allowing for exceptional cases, [to] remain intact").
114. See State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 395, 23 P.3d 801, 804 (2001).
115. See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-4716, 21-4718 (2003).
116. See § 21-4716(b).
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the aggravating factors to those that could be proven based on evidence
that was relevant to the elements of the underlying crime. 124 Prior to trial,
Mr. O'Toole informed the defense attorney what aggravating factors
would be pursued. 125 This provided the defendant with notice and an op-
portunity to prepare an adequate defense.
In discussing the process, Mr. O'Toole indicated that although the
limitations imposed by Blakely create more work for prosecutors, he
feels those limitations were correctly imposed.126 He insisted that sacri-
ficing due process for increased efficiency was not an option he cared to
consider.1 27 He also acknowledged that Blakely placed a strain on the
limited judicial discretion provided by the SRA.128 However, the effi-
ciency with which State v. Dunn was handled assured him that the bifur-
cated model will work to maintain the purpose of the SRA-to avoid
disparity in charging and sentencing.1 29 Mr. O'Toole also noted that
Judge Hayden, the trial judge in State v. Dunn, did not read the charging
document of aggravating factors to the jury. 30 Even though the evidence
that would prove the aggravating factors was the same evidence that
would be presented to prove the underlying crime, Judge Hayden deter-
mined that reading the charging document to the jury would have been
far too prejudicial to the outcome of the trial.' 3'
The bifurcated model, and the version adopted by Washington,
does raise a number of issues. First, the legislature had to decide if a bi-
furcated trial should be available for all aggravating factors. 32 Second,
the legislature had to determine whether the list of aggravating factors
should have remained illustrative rather than exclusive.' 33 Third, because
the prosecutor must identify which aggravating factors to pursue, an is-
sue arose as to when notice of those aggravating factors should be re-









132. S.B. 5477 restricts a bifurcated trial to only four of the more than forty aggravating factors
that are included in S.B. 5477. S.B. 5477 § 4(3), 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005). See also infra
Part IV.A.
133. S.B. 5477 makes the list of aggravating factors exclusive. S.B. 5477 § 3(3). See also infra
Part WV.B.
134. S.B. 5477 requires that "[a]t any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence
above the standard sentencing range. The notice shall state aggravating circumstances upon which
the requested sentence will be based." S.B. 5477 § 4(1). See also infra Part W.C.
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would use to determine whether bifurcation is warranted. 35 Fifth, the
legislature had to determine whether the second phase of a bifurcated
trial is a hearing or a trial and whether all of the Washington Rules of
Evidence apply.' 36 Finally, although a jury will now decide whether facts
exist to support a finding of an aggravating circumstance, those facts
must be "substantial and compelling" to warrant an exceptional sentence.
Accordingly, the legislature had to decide whether judges, based on their
considerable experience, or the jury, based on its common knowledge
and possibly expert testimony, should make that determination.' 37 The
remainder of this article analyzes the legislature's response to those is-
sues and whether the legislature or the courts may need to reevaluate that
response.
IV. WASHINGTON CORRECTLY ADOPTED THE BIFURCATED TRIAL
MODEL BUT FAILED To INCLUDE PROTECTIONS THAT ENSURE THE
SYSTEM IS FAIR TO PROSECUTORS, VICTIMS, AND THE ACCUSED.
In order to comport with the requirements of Blakely and to protect
the policy considerations addressed by the existing sentencing guide-
lines, the Washington Legislature correctly adopted the bifurcated trial
model. Although this legislative response successfully solves some of the
issues outlined above, it creates significant constitutional concerns re-
garding the rights to a fair and speedy trial that must be addressed by the
legislature.138
Section A suggests that the legislature failed to protect the constitu-
tional right of defendants to a fair trial because it allows bifurcation for
only four of the more than forty aggravating factors that are recognized
by S.B. 5477. Despite the legislature's short-sighted recognition of ag-
gravating factors that may warrant bifurcation, section B recognizes that
the legislature appropriately made the list of aggravating factors exclu-
sive rather than illustrative. Section C asserts that although the legislature
correctly required that all aggravating factors be alleged prior to trial or a
guilty plea, it did not address how a court should handle new evidence of
135. S.B. 5477 allows bifurcation "if the evidence supporting the aggravating fact is not part of
the res gestae of the charged crime, if the evidence is not otherwise admissible in trial of the charged
crime, and if the court finds that the probative value of the evidence to the aggravated fact is sub-
stantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury's ability to determine guilt or innocence for
the underlying crime." S.B. 5477 § 4(3). See also infra Part IV.D.
136. S.B. 5477 is silent on this issue. See also infra Part MVE.
137. S.B. 5477 requires that the judge determine whether substantial and compelling reasons
justify an exceptional sentence. S.B. 5477 § 3. See also infra Part IV.F.
138. The Washington Supreme Court recently held that the SRA was facially constitutional in
the wake of Blakely. State v. Hughes, Nos. 74147-6, 75053-0, 75063-7, 2005 WL 851137, at *5
(Wash. Apr. 14, 2005). The court held that "because there is at least one way in which RCW
9.94A.535 can be applied constitutionally, it cannot be declared facially unconstitutional." Id.
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an aggravating factor that emerges during trial and the implications that
such a process may have on a defendant's right to a speedy trial. Section
D argues that, at the discretion of the judge, bifurcated trials should be
available in all trials that involve an aggravating factor if evidence to
support the aggravating factor is not part of the res gestae of the underly-
ing crime, would not be otherwise admissible, and would be unfairly
prejudicial to the defendant. Section E asserts that the legislature should
have required that the Washington Rules of Evidence be applied to the
second phase of a bifurcated trial. Finally, Section F argues that the legis-
lature should have required that both the judge and jury determine
whether the aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial and
compelling to warrant an exceptional sentence.
A. The Legislature Failed to Protect the Constitutional Rights of Defen-
dants by Arbitrarily Limiting the Availability of Bifurcated Trials To
Four of the Forty-Plus Aggravating Factors.
The purpose of having a bifurcated trial is to protect a defendant's
constitutional right to a fair trial because Blakely requires that a jury now
hear evidence of aggravating factors. The problem is that such evidence
is, without question, very inflammatory and will often evoke the jury's
passion and prejudice-after all, it is evidence showing the egregious
nature of the underlying crime. Before Blakely, a jury did not hear this
evidence because evidence of aggravating factors is not usually relevant
to the elements of the charged crime and is very prejudicial. 39 For ex-
ample, the fact that a defendant knew his assault victim was pregnant, an
aggravating factor, 140 is not relevant to the elements of assault. However,
such evidence would undoubtedly prejudice the jury. Not many jurors
can be fair when told that a defendant is accused of attacking a woman
whom he knew was pregnant. Unless such evidence is admissible to
prove elements of the underlying crime, it should not be admitted during
the guilt phase of the trial.
Accordingly, subject to a judge's discretion, bifurcation should be
available for all aggravating factors. However, S.B. 5477 arbitrarily lim-
its the availability of bifurcation to only four 14 1 of the forty-plus aggra-
139. Washington Rule of Evidence 403 provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." WASH. R. EVID. 403.
140. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(2)(c) (2004).
141. S.B. 5477 section 4(3) states the following:
Evidence regarding any facts supporting aggravating circumstances under RCW
9.94A.535(3) (a) through (y), shall be presented to the jury during the trial of the alleged
crime, unless the state alleges the aggravating circumstances listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3)
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vating factors listed in that bill.' 42 In other words, evidence of aggravat-
ing factors will be admissible during the guilt phase of most trials. This
arbitrary limitation applies even if a trial judge feels that bifurcation is
necessary to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. 43
The legislature may have been concerned about the fiscal impact of pro-
viding bifurcated trials, but that concern seems disingenuous given the
very small number of exceptional sentences that are contested in Wash-
ington each year. 144
It is easy to foresee the unfairness of this limitation, namely, that it
will result in the conviction of innocent defendants. For example, the
following aggravating factors are not eligible for bifurcated trials: the
crime involved multiple victims;145 the crime was committed against a
Good Samaritan; 46 the crime was committed against a woman who the
defendant knew was pregnant;147 or the crime was a rape that resulted in
pregnancy.48
A rape that results in pregnancy illustrates the significant problem
created by S.B. 5477's arbitrary limitation of bifurcated trials. If a defen-
dant is falsely accused of such a crime, S.B. 5477 requires that the jury
hear facts regarding the pregnancy when deciding whether that defendant
was guilty of rape. Pre-Blakely, such evidence was inadmissible during
the guilt phase of the trial because it is irrelevant to the elements of rape
and highly prejudicial. But now, as a result of Blakely and S.B. 5477's
arbitrary limitation, such evidence must be shown to the jury when it de-
termines guilt. 149 Bifurcation would eliminate the potential prejudice cre-
ated by that evidence, but S.B. 5477 precludes bifurcated trials for crimes
that involve that aggravating factor.150
(e)(iv), (h)(i), (o), or (t). If one of these aggravating circumstances is alleged, the trial
court may conduct a separate proceeding if the evidence supporting the aggravating fact
is not part of the res gestae of the charged crime, if the evidence is not otherwise admissi-
ble in trial of the charged crime, and if the court finds that the probative value of the evi-
dence to the aggravated fact is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the
jury's ability to determine guilt or innocence for the underlying crime.
142. S.B. 5477 § 3(3).
143. S.B. 5477 section 3(3) restricts a judge's ability to order a "separate proceeding" (that is,
bifurcation) to "one of these aggravating circumstances." However, "these aggravating circum-
stances" refers to only the four factors listed in RCW 9.94A.535(3) (e)(iv), (h)(i), (o), and (t).
144. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
145. S.B. 5477 § 3(3)(d)(i).
146. S.B. 5477 § 3(3)(w).
147. S.B. 5477 § 3(3)(c).
148. S.B. 5477 § 3(3)(i).
149. S.B. 5477 section 4(3) states the following: "Evidence regarding any facts supporting
aggravating circumstances ... shall be presented to the jury during the trial of the alleged crime ...
150. S.B. 5477 limits a judge's ability to order a bifurcated trial to only four of the more than
forty aggravating factors. See S.B. 5477 § 4(3); supra note 143.
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The purpose of a bifurcated trial is to protect a defendant's constitu-
tional right to a fair trial because Blakely requires that a jury hear evi-
dence of aggravating factors that may be unfairly prejudicial. Accord-
ingly, bifurcation should be available in all cases where a judge deter-
mines it is needed to protect a defendant's constitutional rights.
B. The Legislature Correctly Made the List ofAggravating
Factors Exclusive Rather Than Illustrative.
Justice Scalia noted that making a list of aggravating factors illus-
trative rather than exclusive was "immaterial" to the Court's holding in
Blakely.151 As the Washington Supreme Court has interpreted the Wash-
ington Constitution to provide the same protection as the Sixth Amend-
ment, 152 the Blakely decision offered little guidance to the Washington
Legislature as to whether the list of aggravating factors must be illustra-
tive or exclusive. 53 However, because prosecutors are now solely re-
sponsible for charging a defendant with aggravating factors, their discre-
tion is critically important and must be sufficiently restrained.
History provides a good starting point for the legislature's analysis.
During May 14-15, 1982, the original Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
sion discussed whether "any further direction [should] be provided to the
judge and the Court of Appeals regarding departure from the range?"' 154
The Commission discussed two options: 1) whether it should create an
advisory list of aggravating factors to guide the discretion of judges or 2)
whether it should merely note "the need to reserve departure for the truly
exceptional case" and "[a]fter a year, analyze the justifications used for
departures" to determine whether it was necessary to "adopt a list of ap-
propriate and/or inappropriate factors at that time.' 55 The Commission
ultimately chose the first option, as evidenced by the illustrative list in
the SRA. 15 6
However, the Commission's discussion that day sheds light on the
important issue of whether the list of aggravating factors should be ex-
clusive or illustrative. While both the King County Prosecuting Attorney
151. 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004) ("The State tries to distinguish Apprendi and Ring by point-
ing out that the enumerated grounds for departure in its regime are illustrative rather than exhaustive.
This distinction is immaterial.").
152. See State v. Hopper, 118 Wash. 2d 151, 156, 822 P.2d 775, 778 (1992).
153. S.B. 5477 converts the illustrative list of aggravating factors in RCW 9.94A.535 to an
exclusive list. S.B. 5477 § 3(3) ("The following circumstances are an exclusive list of [aggravating]
factors that can support a sentence above the standard range.").
154. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, OFFICIAL MEETING MINUTES 38 (May 14-15,
1982) (a bound copy of these minutes is available at the law library of the Seattle University School
of Law) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION MINUTES].
155. Id.
156. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(2) (2004).
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Norm Maleng and King County Superior Court Judge Joseph Coleman
stressed their belief that the list should be advisory and non-exclusive,
each agreed that the list would "help restrain the judges from going out-
side the guidelines on inappropriate factors" and would "help focus judi-
cial discretion."' 157 Snohomish County Superior Court Judge Paul Hansen
agreed that a list was needed and that relying on the courts of appeal to
generate a list "will take a long time and in the meantime, create a great
deal of uncertainty." ' 5 8 Justice Charles Johnson "said that if a list is used,
it will invite appeals" but indicated his belief that there would not be any
problems in the appellate review if the judges merely followed the lan-
guage in the statute. 15
9
The need for discretionary restraint on prosecutors is arguably
greater after Blakely because a prosecutor's initial charging decision will
determine what aggravating factors are alleged at trial. 160 Some of the
factors used to justify exceptional sentences in 2003 illustrate why limits
on that discretion is needed. For example, the "[s]entence will promote
respect for the law" and the "[d]efendant is a threat to the community"
were cited as justifications for sentence enhancements in 2003.161
Furthermore, more than twenty years after the SRA was adopted, 162
the legislature was likely satisfied that the statutory list of factors was
broad enough to eliminate the original concern that the list be sufficiently
comprehensive. To ensure that this concern was addressed, 163 the legisla-
ture identified many of the common law factors that have emerged 164
157. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION MINUTES, supra note 154, at 38-39.
158. Id. at 39.
159. Id. at 40.
160. See supra Part III.B (discussing Mr. O'Toole's charging decision in State v. Dunn).
161. STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 102, at 43-44.
162. Informal guidelines have been used by Washington courts and prosecutors since the late
1970s and those guidelines were considered by the Sentencing Guidelines Commission when it
developed its original proposals. BOERNER, supra note 71, at 2-25.
163. An exclusive list could pose a significant problem in cases where the facts do not meet
one of the statutory factors, but create a level of severity that public policy would recognize as suffi-
cient to impose an exceptional sentence. See O'Toole Interview, supra note 6. Additional factors
were created by common law to address conduct overlooked by the previously illustrative list. Id.
164. For example, in 2003 the following non-statutory aggravating factors were cited by judges
as reasons for imposing an exceptional sentence: "[s]eriousness of the offense/more egregious than
the typical"; "[miajor economic offense substantially greater than typical for the offense"; "[r]apid
recidivism"; "[d]rug offense - quantity substantially larger than personal use (dealing)"; "[c]riminal
history score greater than 9 points"; "[slophisticated and well planned methods (not an economic or
drug offense)"; "[i]njuries were greater than necessary for the crime"; "[d]efendant violated zone of
privacy"; "[c]ontinuing criminal activity after arrest or while on probation or parole"; "[d]efendant
showed no remorse"; "[w]eapons were present"; "[e]xcessive alcohol or drug use"; "[ilnability to
conform conduct to requirements of the law"; "[tihe crime caused extreme emotional damage to the
victim"; "[t]he defendant committed the offense to cover up other criminal behavior"; "[d]efendant
is a threat to the community"; and "[s]entence will promote respect for the law." STATISTICAL
SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING, supra note 102, at 43-44.
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since the passing of the SRA and incorporated those factors into the re-
vised statutory list. 165
An exclusive list also provides for greater accountability among
prosecutors 166 and will reduce the chance of "new" aggravating factors
running afoul of the real facts doctrine. 167 Additionally, an exclusive list
will serve the purpose of providing citizens with advance notice of con-
duct that may trigger an exceptional sentence and will reduce the possi-
bility of a defendant receiving such a sentence for conduct that the legis-
lature did not believe provided sufficient grounds for an exceptional sen-
tence. 16 8
C. The Legislature Correctly Required That All Aggravating Factors Be
Alleged Prior to Trial or the Entering of a Guilty Plea But Did Not Ad-
dress How Courts Should Handle New Evidence That Emerges at Trial.
All the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense . . .
stated with such certainty and precision, that the defendant ... may
be enabled to determine the species of offence they constitute, in
order that he may prepare his defense accordingly ... and that there
may be no doubt as to the judgment which should be given, if the
defendant be convicted. 169
Because of the Blakely decision, a prosecutor must now persuade a
jury, not a judge, that an aggravating factor exists. As such, the prosecu-
tor's charging decision will have a substantial impact on what aggravat-
165. S.B. 5477 § 3(3), 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
166. See generally BOERNER, supra note 71, at 2-29 (discussing the increased accountability in
plea bargaining that resulted from adoption of the sentencing guidelines).
167. RCW 9.94A.530 codifies the real facts doctrine and makes it clear that "[f]acts that estab-
lish the elements of a more serious crime or additional crimes may not be used to go outside the
standard sentence range except upon stipulation or when specifically provided for in RCW
9.94A.535(2)(d), (e), (g), and (h)." WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.530 (2004). In other words, the
prosecutor may not seek an exceptional sentence for conduct that could be punished under a more
serious crime or a different crime. See also State v. Wakefield, 130 Wash. 2d 464, 475-76, 925 P.2d
183, 189 (1996) ("A trial court may not impose a sentence based on the elements of a more serious
crime that the State did not charge or prove."); State v. Coffey, No. 29129-1-II, 2003 WL 21916384,
at *2 (Wash. App. Apr. 12, 2003) ("Facts that establish the elements of a more serious crime or
additional crimes may not be used to go outside the presumptive sentence range."), review denied,
151 Wash. 2d 1014, 89 P.3d 712 (2004). But see State v. Tiemey, 74 Wash. App. 346, 351, 872 P.2d
1145, 1148 (1994) ("[A]t sentencing, the trial court is not prohibited from considering those facts
closely connected to the circumstances underlying the charged offense simply because they also
establish elements of additional uncharged crimes."), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1172 (1995).
168. An exclusive list may create a political problem for prosecutors. Because a longer list has
been created, prosecutors may face the prospect of having to address the concerns of victims and law
enforcement officers who believe a defendant's conduct satisfies one of the new factors but the
prosecutor has decided not to pursue the aggravating factor due to considerations other than the
desire for a harsher sentence (that is, plea bargaining, requisite resources, and so on).
169. J. ARCHIBOLD, PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 44 (15th ed. 1862).
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ing factors are pursued.170 Given the Court's recognition in Blakely of the
immaterial and merely semantic distinction between aggravating factors
and elements, and given Washington's protection of the right to timely
notice,17 1 the legislature correctly required that all aggravating factors be
alleged prior to trial or prior to the entering of a guilty plea.'72
Early notice will ensure that defendants are sufficiently aware of
the full punishment that they may face if they choose not to plea bargain
and go to trial. 173 Additionally, early notice serves the interests of the
State by providing defendants an additional incentive to enter into a plea
agreement and by ensuring that prosecutors give thought and reflection
to whether an exceptional sentence is appropriate. 74 These benefits are
particularly important given the role of plea bargaining in cases where an
exceptional sentence is imposed. 75 Furthermore, because the second
170. See O'Toole Interview, supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text (discussing Mr.
O'Toole's charging decision in State v. Dunn).
171. "Any analysis of the reach of the Sixth Amendment and Washington Const[itution] art. 1,
§ 22 (amend. 10) should begin with the minimum requirement that all essential elements of a crime,
statutory and nonstatutory, must be included in the charging document so as to apprise the defendant
of the charges against him and to allow him to prepare his defense." State v. Hopper, 118 Wash. 2d
151, 155, 822 P.2d 775 (1992); see also WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22 ("In criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person, or by counsel, to demand the nature and
cause of the accusation against him .... ).
172. S.B. 5477 states that "[a]t any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial
rights of the defendant are not prejudiced, the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence
above the standard sentencing range. The notice shall state aggravating circumstances upon which
the requested sentence will be based." S.B. 5477 § 4, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
173. Prior to the enactment of the SRA, the decision to seek enhancements was at the discre-
tion of the prosecuting attorney. Under the SRA, the discretion to impose an exceptional sentence is
vested solely in the sentencing judge. BOERNER, supra note 71, at 9-58. Although Professor Boemer
argues that "the possibility of an exceptional sentence always exists, and notice of that fact is inher-
ent in the statutory provisions which create the possibility," this argument rejects the contention that
such unchecked discretion is in fact sufficient notice under a due process analysis. Id. Moreover, as
Professor Boerner notes:
There is no reason, however, why a prosecutor who intends to advocate the existence of sub-
stantial and compelling circumstances should not inform the defendant of that fact .... Provid-
ing notice of that decision to the defense attorney and the defendant will avoid the need to liti-
gate the constitutionality of not providing notice and will assist in insuring that all parties are
fully prepared to present their positions at sentencing hearing.
Id. at 9-58.
174. "Hopefully prosecutors will seek exceptional sentences only after consideration and re-
flection, and thus their decision will occur before the time of the sentencing hearing." BOERNER,
supra note 71, at 9-59.
175. Out of 490 cases in which a court mitigated the defendant's sentence in 2003, the follow-
ing reasons were given: "[a]ll parties agreed to mitigated sentence" (318 times); and "[p]art of a
mitigated plea agreement" (118 times). STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF ADULT FELONY SENTENCING,
supra note 102, at 41-42. Assuming no overlap in these reasons, plea bargaining appears to have
played a role in 89 percent of cases where an exceptional sentence was mitigated. Out of 628 cases
in which a court imposed an exceptional sentence for an aggravating factor in 2003, the following
plea-bargain initiated reasons were given: "[d]efendant agreed to prison, greater sentence, or treat-
ment" (527 times); "[t]he sentence was the result of a plea" (92 times); and the sentence was "[p]art
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phase of a bifurcated trial will require additional time and resources of
the court, early notice allows the judge to begin the second phase of the
trial immediately after a guilty verdict.
It is unclear whether changing the current statutory list of factors
from illustrative to exclusive will provide defendants with sufficient no-
tice so that a prosecutor could choose to delay notice until after the first
phase of the trial. In other words, does an exclusive list of aggravating
factors provide sufficient notice'7 6 of the factors that might apply in the
defendant's case? It would seem that fairness (and possibly due process)
mandates that the second phase be suspended until the defendant has had
sufficient time to prepare a defense to those factors alleged by the prose-
cutor. 177 And given that a prosecutor must allege the material elements of
the crime that a defendant has allegedly committed, 78 it seems that the
prosecutor must also allege the particular aggravating factors that a de-
fendant's conduct has allegedly fulfilled.
Although a reviewing court liberally construes the charging docu-
ment, finding sufficient notice if the necessary elements are found by
"fair construction" of that document, 179 the nature of aggravating factors
(they are factual reasons for imposing a harsher punishment) suggests
that the mere factual description of the defendant's conduct, combined
with an exclusive list of factors, does not give the defendant sufficient
notice of the aggravating factors that will be pursued in his case. 80 Al-
though the aggravating factor must address conduct that is separate from
the underlying crime, a defendant may have a difficult time preparing a
of a Mitigated Plea Agreement" (1 time). Id. at 43-44. Again assuming no overlap in these reasons,
plea bargaining appears to have played a role in 99 percent of those cases. Id. Finally, out of 55 cases
where the exceptional sentence was within the standard range in 2003, the following reasons were
offered that suggest plea bargaining was involved: "Defendant agreed to prison, greater sentence, or
treatment" (18 times); "All parties agreed to mitigated sentence" (5 times); "The sentence was the
result of a plea" (5 times); and "Part of a Mitigated Plea Agreement" (5 times). Id. at 45. Assuming
no overlap, this would be 60 percent of those cases. Even assuming considerable overlap, these
numbers suggest that plea bargaining plays a substantial role in a large number of cases that involve
an exceptional sentence.
176. Washington requires that a defendant be clearly notified of the charges, including the
material elements and the essential supporting facts, so that the defendant "will be able to prepare
and mount a defense at trial." State v. McCarty, 140 Wash. 2d 420, 425, 998 P.2d 296, 299 (2000);
see also State v. Hopper, 118 Wash. 2d 151, 155, 822 P.2d 777 (1992).
177. See McCarty, 140 Wash. 2d at 425, 998 P.2d at 299.
178. Id.
179. Id.; Hopper, 118 Wash. 2d at 156, 822 P.2d at 778 (noting that courts should be guided by
"common sense and practicality" in construing such language and that "[e]ven missing elements
may be implied if the language supports such a result").
180. For example, in Hopper, the Washington Supreme Court noted that dismissal is proper
when the charging instrument "fail[s] to set forth the essential elements of a crime in such a way that
the defendant is notified of both the illegal conduct and the crime with which he is charged." 118
Wash. 2d at 155, 822 P.2d at 778.
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defense by essentially guessing which aspects of her conduct might give
rise to an aggravating factor. 181 Notice of the specific aggravating factors
to be pursued may appear redundant to the prosecutor, 182 but such notice
would undoubtedly assist the defendant in preparing an adequate de-
fense.
The most significant problem with requiring that all aggravating
factors be alleged prior to trial will be the emergence of evidence at trial
that would support a non-alleged aggravating factor. If the prosecutor
attempts to amend the charge to include a new aggravating factor, the
defendant could claim that she did not have sufficient notice to prepare a
defense or that she has been deprived of her right to a speedy trial.183
S.B. 5477 does address this situation.
Two exceptions could solve this problem. First, as the Court men-
tioned in Blakely,184 if the new evidence is separate from the underlying
crime, such as evidence of perjury, the prosecutor would be free to bring
a new and separate charge against the defendant for that crime. Although
the policy in favor of judicial economy might militate against this ap-
proach, the limited number of exceptional sentences in Washington' 85
suggests that the impact would be minimal.
Second, if new evidence arose in a bifurcated trial, the prosecutor
could simply provide notice to the defendant during the first phase of the
trial so that the defendant has sufficient time to prepare a defense to the
newly charged factor. Given that the list of aggravating factors is fairly
short and fairly definitive, and that a defendant will usually know
whether evidence of a new aggravating factor may emerge at trial, it
seems that justice would not require a significant delay. For example, if it
emerged at trial that the defendant knew the victim of a violent offense
was pregnant, an aggravating factor under the existing guidelines, 86 the
defendant would need little time to prepare a sufficient defense. In those
cases where new evidence emerges that is of sufficient surprise or com-
181. This concern may be of less importance in Washington because S.B. 5477 limits the
availability of bifurcation to only four of the more than forty aggravating factors. See supra notes
141 and 142 and accompanying text.
182. "The reason that a notice requirement was not included is that an exceptional sentence is a
possibility in every sentencing under the SRA. To require that each defendant be given notice of that
ever-existent potentiality would be redundant." BOERNER, supra note 71, at 9-58.
183. Whether the addition of aggravating factors at trial will raise speedy trial concerns must
be addressed by the legislature. If aggravating factors are now viewed as analogous to elements of
the underlying crime, then the right to a speedy trial should apply; however, if they are not viewed as
analogous to elements of the underlying crime, but merely sentencing factors, then the right to a
speedy trial should not apply.
184. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2539, n. 11 (2004).
185. Boemer Interview, supra notes 12, 112.
186. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535(2)(c) (2004).
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plexity, a delay in the second phase may merely be a cost of complying
with Blakely.
New evidence of an aggravating factor during a non-bifurcated trial
raises an interesting dilemma that is not addressed by S.B. 5477. Al-
though a judge might suspend the trial so the defendant could adjust his
defense to account for the new aggravating factor, and a prosecutor
would be free to amend the charging document to reflect the new fac-
tor, 187 that solution seems unworkable because the defendant might be
constantly faced with dodging aggravating factors. Additionally, a de-
fendant could be given the incentive to disclose aggravating evidence at
trial in the hope of winning some delay. Although the defendant would
expose herself to a higher sentence, in some cases the delay may be suf-
ficiently advantageous to the defense. 188
In order to protect the State's interest in reaching a punishment that
matches the defendant's conduct, and in order to protect the defendant's
right to timely notice and an adequate defense, the legislature should
have allowed prosecutors to plead all aggravating factors for which they
have a good faith basis to believe can be demonstrated at trial. 189 If the
prosecutor sits on evidence that is eventually used to add an aggravating
factor, the legislature should have provided discretion for a judge to pre-
vent such an amendment to the charges.190 However, in cases where the
majority of evidence that supports an aggravating factor emerges for the
first time at trial, the legislature should have provided a provision that
allows the prosecutor to amend the charge against the defendant, but also
allows the defendant sufficient time to prepare a defense to the amended
charge. 191
187. Assuming the amendment would not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial. See
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
188. For example, a defendant might be willing to expose herself to a harsher sentence if the
subsequent delay provided an opportunity to develop a defense to damaging or unsuspected testi-
mony that emerged at trial.
189. Shortly after the SRA was adopted, Professor Boemer indicated that "[i]n a series of
interrelated standards, the Act instructs prosecutors to file charges which are realistic and which they
intend to pursue to conviction .... The practice of filing charges with the intent that they be rou-
tinely reduced in return for a plea of guilty is expressly disapproved." BOERNER, supra note 71, at 1-
3.
190. S.B. 5477 appears to acknowledge such judicial discretion by providing that "[a]t any
time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea if substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced,
the state may give notice that it is seeking a sentence above the standard sentencing range." S.B.
5477 § 4(1), 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005).
191. S.B. 5477 appears to preclude such an amendment by restricting the prosecutor to aggra-
vating factors that are alleged "[alt any time prior to trial or entry of the guilty plea." S.B. 5477 §
4(l).
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D. Bifurcated Trials Should Be Available When a Judge Determines That
Evidence to Support the Aggravating Factors Is Not Part of the Res
Gestae of the Underlying Crime, Would Not Otherwise Be Admissible,
and Would Be Unfairly Prejudicial to the Defendant.
In order to ensure that judges have the discretion to order bifurcated
trials when needed to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a fair
trial, the legislature should have allowed judges to order bifurcation
when evidence to support the aggravating factors (1) is not part of the res
gestae of the underlying crime, (2) would not otherwise be admissible,
and (3) would be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant during the guilt
phase of his trial. The first two elements are fairly straightforward: If
evidence was relevant and admissible during the guilt phase of a trial
before Blakely, bifurcation is unnecessary. But the third element, whether
that evidence is unfairly prejudicial, is a more difficult question.
The determination of "unfair prejudice" should not be analogous to
a prejudicial determination under Rule of Evidence 403 because highly
prejudicial evidence will be at its probative peak when used to prove the
existence of an aggravating factor. Unfortunately, this is exactly the ap-
proach used by S.B. 5477.192
For example, if a defendant is accused of violently assaulting a
woman that he knows is pregnant (an aggravating factor 93) evidence that
the defendant knew the victim was pregnant is very probative of that ag-
gravating factor. But that same evidence is highly inflammatory. How-
ever, if a judge must determine whether that evidence is "unfairly preju-
dicial" under Washington Rule of Evidence 403, many judges would
deny the defendant's motion for a bifurcated trial because the evidence is
highly probative of the aggravating factor, and that probative value is not
substantially outweighed by the potential prejudice of that evidence to
the defendant. Although Rule 403 works well when eliminating cumula-
tive prejudicial evidence or restricting the way a party proves an element,
it is not appropriate for determining whether a prosecutor can bootstrap
evidence that is only relevant to an aggravating factor and not to an ac-
tual element of the underlying crime.
192. S.B. 5477 states the following: "If one of these aggravating circumstances is alleged, the
trial court may conduct a separate proceeding if the evidence supporting the aggravating fact is not
part of the res gest[a]e of the charged crime, if the evidence is not otherwise admissible in [the] trial
of the charged crime, and if the court finds that the probative value of the evidence to the aggravated
fact is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury's ability to determine guilt or
innocence for the underlying crime." S.B. 5477 § 4(3).
193. This example is truly a hypothetical because S.B. 5477 does not allow a judge to order a
bifurcated trial if the defendant is charged with this aggravating factor. See S.B. 5477 §§ 3(3)(c),
4(3).
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Rather than rely on an analogy to Rule 403, the legislature should
have allowed a judge to order a bifurcated trial if it is necessary to pro-
tect the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial that is implicit in
our notions of due process.' 94 Although the "too prejudicial" standard
may be too ambiguous, at least judges would have the discretion to order
bifurcation when they feel justice so requires.
E. The Legislature Should Have Required That the Rules of Evidence
Apply to the Second Phase of a Bifurcated Trial.
Although the Washington Rules of Evidence do not currently apply
to evidence presented during a sentencing hearing, 95 the legislature
should have required that the Rules apply to the second phase of a bifur-
cated trial. 196 The Blakely decision represents an acknowledgement by
the United States Supreme Court that any increase in a defendant's pun-
ishment deserves procedural protections, regardless of the forum that
gave rise to that punishment. The fact that Washington's pre-Blakely sys-
tem allowed a sentencing judge to decide disputed facts by a preponder-
ance of the evidence,' 97 rather than beyond a reasonable doubt as re-
quired by Blakely, 198 illustrates the outdated rationale that has likely led
to the rejection of the Rules of Evidence during sentencing hearings. The
legislature had an opportunity, similar to the opportunity it grasped' 99
194. For example, Kansas, which has adopted a bifurcated trial approach, allows a judge to
order bifurcation if it is "in the interest ofjustice." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718(b)(4) (2003).
195. State v. Strauss, 119 Wash. 2d 401, 418, 832 P.2d 78, 87 (1992) ("While the Rules of
Evidence do not strictly apply at such hearings, evidence admitted at a sentencing hearing must still
meet due process requirements.").
196. S.B. 5477 does not specifically address whether the Washington Rules of Evidence apply
to the second phase of a bifurcated trial. The language of S.B. 5477 does not refer to the second
phase as a "trial" but as a "separate proceeding." See S.B. 5477 § 4(3)(4).
197. RCW 9.94A.530 limits the information that may be considered for the imposition of an
exceptional sentence to the following:
[N]o more information than is admitted by the plea agreement, or admitted, acknowl-
edged, or proved in a trial or at the time of sentencing. Acknowledgement includes not
objecting to information stated in the presentence reports. Where the defendant disputes
material facts, the court must either not consider the fact or grant an evidentiary hearing
on the point. The facts shall be deemed proved at the hearing by a preponderance of the
evidence.
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.530 (2004).
198. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (holding that "every defendant has
the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all the facts legally essential to the punish-
ment").
199. See BOERNER, supra note 71, at 3-15 (comparing the sentencing process before the SRA,
where an administrative body determined sentencing, there was no right to an attorney for indigents,
there was no evidentiary standard, and defendants were required to receive only part of the informa-
tion used for sentencing, with the requirements of the SRA, which replaced the administrative body
with a superior court judge, provided a right to an attorney during sentencing for indigents, required
1150
Exceptional Sentences & Blakely
with the enactment of the SRA, to improve the procedural and eviden-
tiary protections afforded to criminal defendants when they are charged
with an aggravating factor. Ensuring that the Rules of Evidence apply to
the second phase of a bifurcated trial would help provide such protection.
Introduction of the Rules of Evidence is justified for a variety of
reasons. First, the Rules ensure that a jury makes its determination on the
most reliable evidence and not on passion or prejudice. Because a judge
has already determined that a concern for prejudice required a bifurcated
trial, and because these cases involve conduct that the legislature has
identified as sufficiently egregious to warrant an exceptional sentence,
the protections afforded by the Rules of Evidence are needed to ensure
fairness and neutrality. 200 At a minimum, the legislature should have re-
quired that evidence during the second phase be both reliable and rele-
vant. 20 1
Second, applying the Rules of Evidence to both phases would en-
sure that a prosecutor does not attempt to withhold evidence from the
first phase of the trial, hoping that the evidence will be admitted during
the potentially less-restrictive second phase. Similarly, if the Rules of
Evidence do not apply to the second phase, a prosecutor might be en-
couraged to seek a bifurcated trial in order to avoid the Rules of Evi-
dence that will apply in non-bifurcated trials. 20 2
Finally, as the Blakely case illustrates, the finding of an aggravating
factor can dramatically increase a defendant's sentence,20 3 and sufficient
protections should be afforded to ensure such sentences are justifiably
imposed. It seems starkly unfair that the Rules of Evidence would govern
the evidence in a case where no aggravating factors are alleged, but
would not apply to cases where such factors are alleged and the defen-
dant faces more severe punishment. Given that the defendant's liberty
a preponderance of the evidence evidentiary standard, and mandated that a defendant be aware of all
information used to determine the defendant's sentence).
200. However, as discussed supra note 11, a defendant who attempts to exclude evidence
pursuant to Rule 403 faces a difficult task considering that prejudicial evidence will be at its proba-
tive peak when it is used to prove the existence of an aggravating factor during the second phase of a
bifurcated trial.
201. State v. Bell, 116 Wash. App. 678, 684, 67 P.3d 527, 530 (2003) ("[T]he rules of evidence
do not apply to sentencing proceedings."); see also WASH. R. EVID. I 101(c)(3). But see State v.
Pollard, 66 Wash. App. 779, 784-85, 834 P.2d 51, 54 (1992) ("Evidence admitted at a sentencing
hearing must nevertheless meet due process requirements, such as providing the defendant an oppor-
tunity to refute the evidence presented, and requiring that the evidence be reliable.").
202. For example, at the initial "prejudice hearing" the prosecutor could dramatize minimally
prejudicial evidence in order to convince the judge that bifurcation was needed.
203. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535 (noting that the underlying crime carried a maximum punish-
ment of fifty-three months, but the judge imposed an additional thirty-seven months based on the
aggravating factors).
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interest is equally substantial during both phases of a bifurcated trial,
there is no reason the same protections should not apply to both.
F. The Legislature Should Have Required That Both the Judge and the
Jury Determine Whether the Aggravating Circumstances Are Sufficiently
Substantial and Compelling to Deserve an Exceptional Sentence.
A question remains as to whether the judge or the jury should de-
cide if a particular aggravating circumstance deserves an exceptional
20sentence. 04 The SRA requires that a court generally impose a sentence
within the standard sentence range. 20 5 However, a court may impose an
exceptional sentence for reasons that are substantial and compelling 20 6
and that are separate from those used to compute a standard range sen-
tence under the guidelines. °7 The SRA provides a list of aggravating and
mitigating factors "which the court may consider in the exercise of its
discretion to impose an exceptional sentence. '' 20 8 Historically, any rea-
sons given by the court for enhancing a crime must relate to the crime
209and make it more, or less, egregious. In other words, although Blakely
requires that the jury find facts that establish the existence of an aggra-
vating factor, the question remains as to whether that circumstance is
exceptional-whether it is sufficiently substantial and compelling to jus-
tify an exceptional sentence. 210 Although Washington's pre-Blakely sys-
tem allowed the judge to make that determination, the Blakely court did
not address whether the judge can still make that determination.211
History provides another starting point for this analysis. The official
minutes from meetings of the first Sentencing Guidelines Commission
204. S.B. 5477 leaves this decision with the court. S.B. 5477 § 3, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2005) ("The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it
finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justi-
fying an exceptional sentence.").
205. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.505(2)(a) (2004).
206. § 9.94A.535.
207. State v. Gore, 143 Wash. 2d 288, 315-16, 21 P.3d 262, 277 (2001).
208. § 9.94A.535.
209. State v. Fowler, 145 Wash. 2d 400, 404, 38 P.3d 335, 338 (2002).
210. RCW 9.94A.535 provides that a judge may impose an exceptional sentence if, considering
the aggravating factors, the judge believes that "there are substantial and compelling reasons justify-
ing an exceptional sentence." § 9.94A.535. As such, although there may be evidence that a defen-
dant's conduct meets one or more of the aggravating factors, the judge may decide that the conduct
is not sufficiently "substantial and compelling" to warrant an exceptional sentence. See id.
211. Justice Scalia noted in the Blakely decision the following:
Nor does it matter that the judge must, after finding aggravating facts, make a judgment
that they present a compelling ground for departure. He cannot make that judgment with-
out finding some facts to support it beyond the bare elements of the offense. Whether the
judicially determined facts require a sentence enhancement or merely allow it, the verdict
alone does not authorize the sentence.
Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004).
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provide a glimpse into the reasoning for the substantial and compelling
language. The Commission meeting minutes of December 6, 1982 pro-
vided the following:
George Finkle recommended that the phrase "for substantial and
compelling reasons" be added to the first paragraph so it would
read, "if the court finds for substantial and compelling reasons that
sentencing within the standard range . . . ." Mr. Finkle explained
that this phrase would send a clear and serious message to the
judges of the expected standard and a direction that the normal prac-
212tice would be to sentence within the range.
Although Mr. Finkle's motion failed, 1 3 the minutes from a subse-
quent Commission meeting on January 3, 1983, indicate that Norm
Maleng proposed the "substantial and compelling" language again be-
cause "the present language is silent on the burden of proof, an omission
which the term 'substantial and compelling' would solve. In addition, he
believes the present language is adequate for going below the range but
the language for departing upwards may be too restrictive." 214 The pre-
vious standard was apparently whether the defendant was a "risk to pub-
lic safety," which Donna Schram believed was too broad and focused on
future behavior, not the defendant's criminal act.21 5 Pete Clarke dis-
agreed, indicating that he believed the language would narrow judicial
discretion and make clear that a judge "should be very careful when de-
parting., 216 The new "substantial and compelling" language was passed
unanimously by the Commission.217
As a final check on the new post-Blakely power of the jury and the
prosecution, the legislature was apparently tempted to empower judges to
solely determine whether a defendant's conduct was substantial and
compelling; 218 however, the Committee's deliberations suggest that the
substantial and compelling language was included as an evidentiary
212. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION MINUTES, supra note 154, at 7.
213. id.
214. Norm Maleng proposed language that "[t]he court may impose a sentence outside the
standard sentence range for that offense if it finds, considering the purposes of this act, that there are
substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." SENTENCING GUIDELINES
COMMISSION MINUTES, supra note 154, at 4.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 4-5.
217. Id.
218. And the legislature has done so with S.B. 5477: "The legislature intends that the sentenc-
ing court will then decide whether or not the aggravating fact is a substantial and compelling reason
to impose greater punishment." S.B. 5477 § 1, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); see also S.B.
5477 § 3 ("The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it
finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justi-
fying an exceptional sentence.").
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standard, not as a purely legal standard. Furthermore, although Justice
Scalia did not address whether the judge or jury must make the substan-
tial and compelling determination, the question of whether a defendant's
conduct meets that standard is arguably a factual question whose answer
is used to increase a defendant's sentence. In other words, Blakely may
very well require that the jury make that determination, too.219
Despite the foregoing legislative history and the uncertainty sur-
rounding the dictates of Blakely, the legislature should ensure that the
trial judge keeps a check on the newfound power of the jury and the
prosecution by requiring that both the judge and the jury make findings
that the defendant's conduct was sufficiently substantial and compelling
to warrant an exceptional sentence. The judge can find, as a matter of
law,2 ° that the evidence was not sufficient to justify the imposition of an
exceptional sentence. A judge can rely upon his or her own experience,
as well as comparing facts from other cases, to determine whether a
given crime was truly substantial and compelling. The legislature could
have also required that an appellate court provide a certain amount of
deference to the trial judge's determination that a defendant's conduct
was not sufficiently compelling. Given the extremely prejudicial infor-
mation that will be revealed to the jury during cases where aggravating
factors are alleged, it seems only fair that a judge, who has likely been
exposed to the types of unpleasant facts that give rise to the pursuit of an
exceptional sentence, plays a role in determining whether a particular
crime is truly exceptional. Providing judges with the authority to make a
final check on the "exceptional" finding will ensure that judges are not
fully excluded from the sentencing process and that the system continues
to benefit from their experience and perspective.
219. The prospect of such a determination raises yet another issue. In theory, the legislature
could require that the prosecutor present an expert witness, perhaps a retired judge or prosecutor,
who declares that the robbery committed by the defendant was the worst out of a thousand robberies
of which that expert is aware. The defense would then be obliged to present its own expert who
would testify that the defendant's robbery was bad, but not so "substantial and compelling" as to
warrant an exceptional sentence. But requiring expert witnesses would be costly to the State, which
must bear the cost of the prosecutor's unlimited budget, may be unfairly cost-prohibitive to defen-
dants with private counsel, and would likely be prejudicial to indigent defendants who are repre-
sented by a public defender, given their limited resources for experts. And in those cases that involve
indigent defendants, the State would bear the cost of the expert for both the prosecution and the
defense.
220. See State v. Nordby, 106 Wash. 2d 514, 518, 723 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1986) (recognizing
that RCW 9.94A.210(4)(a) "requires the appellate court to independently determine, as a matter of
law, if the sentencing judge's reasons justify the imposition of a sentence outside the presumptive
range . . . .") (emphasis added); see also State v. Gore, 143 Wash. 2d 288, 315, 21 P.3d 262, 277
(2001) (recognizing that, under RCW 9.94A.210(4), an appellate court may reverse an exceptional
sentence if"as a matter of law an exceptional sentence is not justified by the reasons ....").
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V. CONCLUSION
Faced with the substantial dilemma that Blakely v. Washington cre-
ated for its sentencing system, the Washington Legislature faced the task
of adopting new procedures that address Blakely but respect the policy
considerations that gave rise to the existing sentencing guidelines system.
Although the judicial advisory model may have provided judges more
discretion within sentencing, it would have taken illusory steps to ad-
dress the racial and socioeconomic sentencing disparity that the current
system alleviated, it would have removed any predictability in plea bar-
gaining, and it would have rendered sentencing determinations nearly
unreviewable. The bifurcated trial model suggested by this article, on the
other hand, retains the structure of the current guidelines and comports
with Blakely by ensuring that a jury determines all of the facts that form
the basis for a defendant's punishment. By providing for bifurcation, the
prosecution is able to present all of its evidence to the jury, and the de-
fendant is guaranteed that prejudicial evidence is barred from the trial of
the underlying crime.
In order to protect the constitutional right of all defendants to a fair
trial, the legislature should have made bifurcation an option for all trials
that involve an aggravating factor; however, the legislature failed to do
so. To control the discretion exercised by the prosecutor in determining
what facts justify the imposition of an exceptional sentence, the legisla-
ture properly updated the list of aggravating factors and made the new
list exclusive. In order to comply with the notice requirement of due
process and to expedite the possibility of a plea bargain, the legislature
correctly required that the prosecution allege all aggravating factors be-
fore trial or before entering a guilty plea, but should have allowed the
prosecution to amend the initial charge with additional factors if the ma-
jority of evidence that supports a new factor emerged at trial. Because
the probative value of evidence that supports an aggravating factor is
now substantial, but still highly prejudicial, the legislature should have
allowed judges to order bifurcation when the evidence would not have
been admissible pre-Blakely and when justice so requires. The Washing-
ton Legislature failed to do so. To ensure fairness and neutrality, the leg-
islature also should have required that the Washington Rules of Evidence
apply to both phases of a bifurcated trial. And to ensure that not all judi-
cial discretion is eliminated from the sentencing process, the legislature
should have required that both the judge and the jury determine whether
a defendant's conduct is so substantial and compelling that it deserves an
exceptional sentence. Such a system would comport with the mandates
of Blakely while ensuring that the evolved system is fair to victims, to
prosecutors, and to the accused.
11552005]
